We construct public-key systems that support comparison queries (x ≥ a) on encrypted data as well as more general queries such as subset queries (x ∈ S). These systems also support arbitrary conjunctive queries (P 1 ∧· · ·∧P ) without leaking information on individual conjuncts. We present a general framework for constructing and analyzing public-key systems supporting queries on encrypted data.
Introduction
Queries on encrypted data are easiest to explain with an example. Consider a creditcard payment gateway that observes a stream of encrypted transactions, say encrypted under Visa's public key. The gateway needs to flag all transactions satisfying a certain predicate P . Say, all transactions whose value is over $ 1000. Storing Visa's secret key on the gateway is a bad idea for both security and privacy concerns. Instead, Visa wishes to give the gateway a token TK P that enables the gateway to identify transactions satisfying P without learning anything else about these transactions. Of course, generating the token TK P will require Visa's secret key.
As another example, consider a mail server that receives a stream of email messages encrypted under the recipients public key. If the email message satisfies a certain predicate P the mail server should forward the email to the recipient's pager. If the email satisfies some other predicate P the server should just discard the email. Otherwise, the server should place the email in the recipient's inbox. The recipient does not want to give the mail server the full private key. Instead, she wants to give the server two tokens TK P and TK P enabling the server to test for the predicates P and P without learning any other information about the email.
Our goal is to build a public-key system that supports a rich set of query predicates. In our payment gateway example one can imagine comparison queries such as (value > 1000) or even conjunctions such as (value > 1000) and (TransactionTime > 5pm). The gateway should learn no information other than the value of the conjunctive predicate. In case a conjunction P 1 ∧ P 2 is false, the gateway should not learn which of the two conjuncts P 1 or P 2 is false. In our second example involving a mail server one can imagine testing for subset queries such as (sender ∈ S) where S is a set of sender emails. Conjunctive queries such as (sender ∈ S) and (subject = urgent) also make sense. Perhaps in the distant future, when highly complex queries on encrypted data are possible, one can imagine running an anti-virus/anti-spam predicate on encrypted emails. The mail server learns nothing about incoming encrypted email other than its spam status.
Unfortunately, until now, only simple equality queries on encrypted data were possible. Song et al. [18] developed a mechanism for equality tests on data encrypted with a symmetric key system. Boneh et al. [7] constructed equality tests in the public-key settings.
Our results. We present a general framework for analyzing and constructing searchable publickey systems for various families of predicates. We then construct public-key systems that support comparison queries (such as greater-than) and general subset queries. We also support arbitrary conjunctions. We evaluate our results based on ciphertext size and token size. Let T = {1, 2, . . . , n} and suppose we encrypt a tuple x = (x 1 , . . . , x w ) ∈ T w . Say x 1 is a transaction value, x 2 is a card expiration date, and so on. The following table summarizes our results at a high level. Here (a 1 , . . . , a w ) is an arbitrary vector that defines a conjunctive equality or a comparison predicate. Similarly, A 1 , . . . , A w are arbitrary subsets of {1, . . . , n} that define a conjunctive subset query predicate. We emphasize that when a conjunction predicate is false, the system does not leak which of the w conjuncts caused it. Prior to these results the best systems for comparison and subset queries were the trivial bruteforce systems discussed in Section 3. For comparison queries these systems generate a ciphertext of size O(n w ) and for subset queries they generate a ciphertext of size O(2 nw ). Note that even without conjunction, namely for w = 1, our subset query construction generates ciphertexts that are exponentially shorter than the best known previous solution (O(n) vs. O(2 n )).
The main tool used in these constructions is a new primitive we call Hidden Vector Encryption or HVE for short. This primitive can be viewed as an extreme generalization of Anonymous Identity Based Encryption (AnonIBE) [7, 1, 12] . We show how HVE implies all the results in the table.
Are there public key systems that support larger classes of predicates? Ultimately, one would like a public-key system that supports searches for any predicate computable by a shallow circuit. Presently, this appears to be a difficult open problem.
Related work. Equality tests on encrypted data were considered in [18, 7] . Equality searches on an encrypted audit log were proposed in [19] . Equality tests in the symmetric key settings are closely related to oblivious RAM techniques [16, 13] . Equality tests in the public key settings are closely related to Anonymous Identity Based Encryption (AnonIBE) [1, 12] . Conjunctive equality queries were first studied in [14] . Equality searches on streaming data that hide the requested predicate were discussed in [17] and [4] . Efficient equality searches in databases were recently presented in [2] . Bethencourt et al. [3] recently gave a construction for efficient range queries in a weaker security model. That is, when the encrypted index falls in the specified range, the search token reveals the index.
Definitions
We begin by defining a general framework for queries on encrypted data. Let Σ be a finite set of binary strings. A predicate P over Σ is a function P : Σ → {0, 1}. We say that S ∈ Σ satisfies the predicate if P (S) = 1.
Searchable encryption
Let Φ be a set of predicates over Σ. A Φ-searchable public key system comprises of the following algorithms:
Setup(λ) A probabilistic algorithm that takes as input a security parameter and outputs a public key PK and secret key SK.
Encrypt(PK, S, M ) Encrypts the plaintext pair (S, M ) using the public key PK. We view S ∈ Σ as the searchable field, called an index, and M ∈ M as the data.
GenToken(SK, P ) Takes as input a secret key SK and the description of a predicate P ∈ Φ. It outputs a token TK P .
Query(TK, C) Takes a token TK for some predicate P ∈ Φ as input and a ciphertext C. It outputs a message M ∈ M or ⊥. Roughly speaking, if C is an encryption of (S, M ) then the algorithm outputs M when P (S) = 1 and outputs ⊥ otherwise. The precise requirement is captured in the query correctness property below.
Correctness. The system must satisfy the following correctness property:
• Query correctness: For all (S, M ) ∈ Σ × M and all predicates P ∈ Φ:
Suppose that given a ciphertext C ← Encrypt(PK, S, M ) we are only interested in testing whether a predicate P (S) is satisfied. In this case the message space M can be set to a singleton, say M = {true}. Algorithm Query(TK, C) will return true when P (S) = 1 and ⊥ otherwise. A larger message space M is useful if TK is intended to unlock some M ∈ M whenever the predicate P (S) = 1. For example, when the transaction value is over 1000$ we may want the payment gateway to obtain more information about the transaction. Otherwise, the gateway should learn nothing.
Notice that a Φ-searchable system does not provide a Decrypt algorithm that uses SK to decrypt a ciphertext C and outputs (S, M ). One can always add this capability by also encrypting (S, M ) under a standard public key system. There is no need for the searchable system to explicitely provide this capability. An example -comparison queries. Before defining security, we first give a motivating example using comparison queries. Let Σ = {1, . . . , n} for some integer n. For σ ∈ {1, . . . , n} let P σ be the following comparison predicate:
Let Φ n = {P 1 , . . . , P n } be the set of all n comparison predicates. Suppose the adversary has the tokens for predicates P σ 1 , P σ 2 , . . . , P σw where σ 1 < σ 2 < · · · < σ w . Lets x, y, z be some integers as in Figure 1 . Clearly the adversary can distinguish Encrypt(PK, x, m) from Encrypt(PK, y, m) using the token for the predicate P σ 2 . However, the adversary should not be able to distinguish Encrypt(PK, y, m) from Encrypt(PK, z, m). Indeed, separating an encryption of y from an encryption of z is information that should not be exposed by the tokens at the adversary's disposal. Our definition of security captures this property using the general framework.
Security
We define security of a Φ-searchable system E using a query security game that captures the intuition that tokens TK reveal no unintended information about the plaintext. The game gives the adversary a number of tokens and requires that the adversary cannot use these tokens to deduce unintended information. The game proceeds as follows:
• Setup. The challenger runs Setup(λ) and gives the adversary PK.
• Query phase 1. The adversary adaptively outputs descriptions of predicates P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P q 1 ∈ Φ. The challenger responds with the corresponding tokens TK i ← GenToken(SK, P i ). We refer to such queries as predicate queries.
• Challenge. The adversary outputs two pairs (S 0 , M 0 ) and (S 1 , M 1 ) subject to two restrictions:
The challenger flips a coin β ∈ {0, 1} and gives C * R ← Encrypt(PK, S β , M β ) to the adversary.
The two restrictions ensure that the tokens given to the adversary do not trivially break the challenge. The first restriction ensures that tokens given to the adversary do not directly distinguish S 0 from S 1 . The second restriction ensures that the tokens do not directly distinguish M 0 from M 1 .
• Query phase 2. The adversary continues to adaptively request tokens for predicates P q 1 +1 , . . . , P q ∈ Φ, subject to the two restrictions above. The challenger responds with the corresponding tokens TK i ← GenToken(SK, P i ).
• Guess The adversary returns a guess β ∈ {0, 1} of β.
We define the advantage of adversary A in attacking E as the quantity QU Adv A = | Pr[β = β]−1/2|. Definition 2.1. We say that a Φ-searchable system E is secure if for all polynomial time adversaries A attacking E the function QU Adv A is a negligible function of λ.
Another example -equality queries. Let Σ be some finite set. For σ ∈ Σ let P σ (x) be an equality predicate, namely
Let Φ eq = {P σ for all σ ∈ Σ}. Then a Φ eq -searchable encryption supports equality queries on ciphertexts. It is easy to see that a secure Φ eq -searchable encryption is also an anonymous IBE system [7, 1, 12] -an Identity Based Encryption system where a ciphertext reveals no useful information about the identity that was used to create it. This should not be too surprising since it was previously shown [7, 1] that anonymous IBE is sufficient for equality searches. A Φ eq -searchable encryption system (Setup, Encrypt, GenToken, Query) gives an anonymous IBE as follows:
• Setup IBE (λ) runs Setup(λ) and outputs IBE parameters PK and master key SK.
• Encrypt IBE (PK, I, M ) where I ∈ Σ outputs Encrypt(PK, I, M ).
• Extract IBE (SK, I) where I ∈ Σ outputs TK I ← GenToken(SK, P I ).
• Decrypt IBE (TK I , C) outputs Query(TK I , C).
The correctness property ensures that if C is the result of Encrypt(PK, I, M ) then Query(TK I , C) will output M since P I (I) = 1. It is not difficult to see that the Φ eq -security game ensures semantic security for both the message and the identity. Hence, the resulting system is an anonymous IBE. By considering larger classes of predicates Φ we obtain more general searching capabilities. The challenge is then to build secure encryption schemes that are Φ-searchable for the most general Φ possible.
Chosen ciphertext security. Definition 2.1 easily extends to address chosen ciphertext attacks (CCA), but we do not pursue that here.
Selective security
We will also need a slightly weaker security definition in which the adversary commits to the search strings S 0 , S 1 at the beginning of the game. Everything else remains the same. The game proceeds as follows:
• Setup. The adversary outputs two strings S 0 , S 1 ∈ Σ. The challenger runs Setup(λ) and gives the adversary PK.
• Query phase 1. The adversary adaptively outputs descriptions of predicates P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P q 1 ∈ Φ. The only restriction is that
The challenger responds with the corresponding tokens TK i ← GenToken(SK, P i ).
• Challenge. The adversary outputs two messages M 0 , M 1 ∈ M subject to the restriction that:
• Query phase 2. The adversary continues to adaptively request query tokens for predicates P q 1 +1 , . . . , P q ∈ Φ, subject to the two restrictions (1) and (2). The challenger responds with the corresponding tokens TK i ← GenToken(SK, P i ).
The advantage of adversary A in attacking E is the quantity sQU Adv
We say that a Φ-searchable system E is selectively secure if for all polynomial time adversaries A attacking E the function sQU Adv A is a negligible functions of λ.
The Trivial Construction
Let Σ be a finite set of binary strings. We build a Φ-searchable public key system E TR , for any set of (polynomial time computable) predicates Φ. We refer to this system as the brute force Φ-searchable system.
The brute force system. Let E = (Setup , Encrypt , Decrypt ) be a public-key system. Let Φ = {P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P t } The Φ-searchable system E TR is defined as follows:
Output PK and SK.
Encrypt(PK, S, M ) For i = 1, . . . , t define:
Note that the length of C is linear in n.
GenToken(SK, P ) Here P , the description of predicate Φ, is the index i of
The following lemma proves security of this construction. The proof is a straightforward hybrid argument and is given in Appendix A Lemma 3.1. The system E TR above is a secure Φ-searchable encryption system assuming E is a semantically secure public key system against chosen plaintext attacks.
A third example -conjunctive comparison predicates
Suppose Σ = {1, . . . , n} w for some n, w. Let Φ n,w be the set of predicates
for allā = (a 1 . . . a w ) ∈ {1, . . . , n} w . Then |Φ n,w | = n w . The trivial system in this case produces ciphertexts of length O(n w ). Essentially, the system uses a unary encoding of the w columns and assigns a private key to each cell in this n by w matrix. We will construct a much better system in Section 6.
Background on pairings and complexity assumptions
Our goal is to construct Φ-searchable systems for a large class of predicates Φ that is much better than the trivial construction. To do so we will make use of bilinear maps.
Bilinear groups of composite order
We review some general notions about bilinear maps and groups, with an emphasis on groups of composite order. We follow [9] in which composite order bilinear groups were first introduced.
Let G be a an algorithm called a group generator that takes as input a security parameter λ ∈ Z >0 and outputs a tuple (p, q, G, G T , e) where p, q are two distinct primes, G and G T are two cyclic groups of order n = pq, and e is a function e : G 2 → G T satisfying the following properties:
• (Non-degenerate) ∃g ∈ G such that e(g, g) has order n in G T .
We assume that the group action in G and G T as well as the bilinear map e are all computable in polynomial time in λ. Furthermore, we assume that the description of G and G T includes generators of G and G T respectively.
To summarize, G outputs the description of a group G of order n = pq with an efficiently computable bilinear map. We will use the notation G p , G q to denote the respective subgroups of order p and order q of G.
The bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption
First we review the standard Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption, but in groups of composite order. For a given group generator G define the following distribution P (λ):
For an algorithm A, define A's advantage in solving the composite bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem for G as:
Definition 4.1. We say that G satisfies the composite bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption (cBDH) if for any polynomial time algorithm A we have that cBDH Adv G,A (λ) is a negligible function of λ.
The composite 3-party Diffie-Hellman assumption
Our construction also makes use of a natural assumption in composite bilinear groups. For a given group generator G define the following distribution P (λ):
For an algorithm A, define A's advantage in solving the composite 3-party Diffie-Hellman problem for G as:
Definition 4.2. We say that G satisfies the composite 3-party Diffie-Hellman assumption (C3DH) if for any polynomial time algorithm A we have that C3DH Adv G,A (λ) is a negligible function of λ.
Hidden Vector Encryption
We construct a Φ-searchable encryption system for a general class of equality predicates. We call such systems Hidden Vector Systems or HVEs for short. We then show in Section 6 that our HVE system leads to comparison and subset queries far more efficient than the trivial system.
HVE Definition
Let Σ be a finite set and let * be a special symbol not in Σ. Define Σ * = Σ ∪ { * }. The star * plays the role of a wildcard or "don't care" value. In our applications we typically set Σ = {0, 1}.
For σ = (σ 1 , . . . , σ ) ∈ Σ * define a predicate P HVE σ over Σ as follows. For x = (x 1 , . . . , x ) ∈ Σ set:
In other words, the vector x matches σ in all the coordinates where σ is not * .
for all σ ∈ Σ * }. We refer to as the width of the HVE.
Definition 5.1. A Hidden Vector System (HVE) over Σ is a selectively secure Φ HVE -searchable encryption system.
The case = 1 degenerates to the example discussed in Section 2.2 where we showed equivalence to anonymous IBE [7, 1, 12] . For larger we obtain a more general concept that is much harder to build. In particular, the wildcard character * -which is essential for the applications we have in mind -makes it challenging to construct a Φ HVE -searchable system. We construct an HVE with the following parameters:
where weight σ = (σ 1 , . . . , σ ) is the number of coordinates where σ i = * .
Construction
For our particular HVE construction we will let Σ = Z m for some integer m. We set Σ * = Z m ∪{ * }. Our HVE system works as follows:
Setup(λ) The setup algorithm first chooses random primes p, q > m and creates a bilinear group G of composite order n = pq, as specified in Section 4.1. Next, it picks random elements
and an exponent α ∈ Z p . It keeps all these as the secret key SK.
It then chooses 3 + 1 random blinding factors in G q :
For the public key, PK, it publishes the description of the group G and the values
The message space M is set to be a subset of G T .
The encryption algorithm works as follows:
• choose a random s ∈ Z n and random Z,
The algorithm picks random elements in G q by raising g q to random exponents from Z n .)
• Output the ciphertext:
GenToken(SK, I * ∈ Σ * ) The key generation algorithm will take as input the secret key and an -tuple I * = (I 1 , . . . , I ) ∈ {Z m ∪ { * }} . Let S be the set of all indexes i such that I i = * .
To generate a token for the predicate P HVE I * choose random (r i,1 , r i,2 ) ∈ Z 2 p for all i ∈ S and output:
Query(TK, C) Using the notation in the description of Encrypt and GenToken do:
Correctness Before proving security we first show that the system satisfies the correctness property defined in Section 2.1. Let (I, M ) be a pair in Σ × M and let B * ∈ Σ * . This B * defines a predicate P B * in Φ HVE .
Let (PK, SK)
R ← Setup(λ), C R ← Encrypt(PK, I, M ), and TK R ← GenToken(SK, B * ).
• If P B * (I) = 1 then a simple calculation shows that Query(TK, C) = M .
• If P B * (I) = 0 we show that Pr[Query(TK,
where the probability is over the random bits used to create the ciphertext. Hence, if |M| is sufficiently small compared to n then the probability that Pr[Query(TK, C) = ⊥] is negligible.
Let I = (I 1 , . . . , I ) ∈ Σ and let B * = (B 1 , . . . , B ) ∈ Σ * . Let S be the set of all indexes i such that B i is not a wildcard * at index i. Since P B * (I) = 0 we know that there is some i ∈ S such that B i = I i . Then the decryption equation (3) contains a factor
which is a uniformly distributed value in (G T ) q and is independent of the rest of the equation. Hence equation (3) evaluates to a value indistinguishable from random in G T . It follows that Pr[Query(TK, C) = ⊥] ≥ 1 − |M| n as required.
Extensions In our description above we limited the index space Σ to be Z m . We can expand this space to all of {0, 1} * by taking a large enough m to contain the range of a collision-resistant hash function. Then Encrypt(PK, I ∈ ({0, 1} * ) , M ∈ G T ) first hashes all the coordinates of I into Z m using the collision reistant hash and the applies the Encrypt algorithm described above.
Proof of Security
We prove our scheme selectively secure (as defined in Section 2.3) under the composite 3-party Diffie-Hellman assumption and the bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption. We give the high-level arguments of the proof in this section and defer the proofs of some lemmas to the appendix. Suppose the adversary commits to vectors L 0 , L 1 ∈ Σ at the beginning of the game. Let X be the set of indexes i such that L 0,i = L 1,i and X be the set of indexes i such that L 0,i = L 1,i .
The proof uses a sequence of 2 + 2 games to argue that the adversary cannot win the original security game of Section 2.3 which we denote by G. We begin by slightly modifying the game G into a game G . Games G and G are identical except for how the challenge ciphertext is generated. In G if M 0 = M 1 then the adversary multiplies the challenge ciphertext component C by a random element of G T,p . The rest of the ciphertext is generated as usual. Additionally, if M 0 = M 1 then the challenge ciphertext is generated correctly. The proof is in Appendix B.2. Finally, we define two sequences of hybrid games G j and G j for j = 1, . . . , |X|. We define the game G j as follows. LetX be j lowest indexes in X. In the challenge ciphertext the challenger creates C 0 and C i,1 , C i,2 as normal for all i / ∈X. However, for all i ∈X the challenger creates C i,1 , C i,2 as completely random group elements in G. Additionally, if M 0 = M 1 then C is replaced by a completely random element from G T (otherwise it is created as normal).
We define a game G j as follows. LetX be the j lowest indexes in X and let δ be the (j + 1)-th index in X. In the challenge ciphertext the challenger creates C 0 and C i,1 , C i,2 as normal for all i / ∈X and i = δ. For all i ∈X the challenger creates C i,1 , C i,2 as completely random group elements in G. For i = δ the challenger chooses a random s and creates
Additionally, if M 0 = M 1 then C is replaced by a completely random element from G T (otherwise it is created as normal).
Observe that for all i inX the challenge identity contains no information about L β,i . Therefore the adversary's advantage in game G |X| is 0. Additionally, game G 0 is equivalent toG. We state the following two lemmas whose proofs are given in Appendix B.3 and B.4. G, G 0 , G 1 , G 1 , G 2 , G 2 , . . . , G |X| .
The adversary's advantage in the game G |X| is 0 and the difference in adversary's advantage between any two consecutive hybrid games is negligible by the lemmas above. Hence, no polynomial adversary can win game G with non-negligible advantage.
Applications of HVE
We show how HVE leads to efficient systems for subset queries and conjunctive comparison queries. Throughout the section we let Σ 01 = {0, 1} and Σ 01 * = {0, 1, * }.
Conjunctive comparison queries. In Section 3.1 we defined conjunctive comparison queries and the predicate family Φ n,w . We use HVE to build a Φ n,w -searchable encryption system with ciphertext size O(nw) and token size O(w). Let (Setup HVE , Encrypt HVE , GenToken HVE , Query HVE ) be a secure HVE over Σ nw 01 . Thus, the width of this HVE is = nw. We construct a Φ n,w -searchable system as follows:
• Setup(λ) is the same as Setup HVE (λ).
• Encrypt(PK, S, M ) where S = (x 1 , . . . , x w ) ∈ {1, . . . , n} w . Build a vector σ(S) = (σ i,j ) ∈ Σ nw 01 as follows:
Then output Encrypt HVE (PK, σ(S), M ) which gives a ciphertext of size O(nw). For example, for w = 2 and S = (x 1 , x 2 ) the vector σ(S) looks like:
• GenToken(SK, Pā ) whereā = (a 1 , . . . , a w ) ∈ {1, . . . , n} w . Define σ * (ā) = (σ i,j ) ∈ Σ nw 01 * as follows:
Output TKā R ← GenToken HVE (SK, σ * (ā)) which gives a token of size O(w). For example, for w = 2 andā = (x 1 , x 2 ) the vector σ * (ā) looks like: * · · · * 1 * · · · * * · · · * 1 * · · · *
• Query(TKā, C) output Query HVE (TKā, C)
To argue correctness and security, observe that for a predicate Pā ∈ Φ n,w and an index S ∈ {1, . . . , n} w we have that: Pā(S) = 1 if and only if P HVE σ * (ā) (σ(S)) = 1. Therefore, correctness and security follow from the properties of the HVE. We thus obtain the following immediate theorem. Theorem 6.1. (Setup, Encrypt, GenToken, Query) is a selectively secure Φ n,w -searchable system assuming (Setup HVE , Encrypt HVE , GenToken HVE , Query HVE ) is an HVE over Σ n 01 w.
Conjunctive range queries. We note that a system that supports comparison queries can also support range queries. To search for plaintexts where x ∈ [a, b] the encryptor encrypts the pair (x, x). The predicate then tests x ≥ a ∧ x ≤ b.
Subset queries
Next we show how to search for general subset predicates. Let T be a set of size n. For a subset A ⊆ T we define a subset predicate as follows:
We wish to support searches for any subset predicate. More generally, we wish to support searches for conjunctive subset predicates over T w . That is, let σ = (A 1 , . . . , A w ) be a w-tuple where A i ∈ T for all i = 1, . . . , w. Then σ is an elements of (2 T ) w . Define the predicate P σ : T w → {0, 1} as follows:
Let Φ = { P σ for all σ ∈ (2 T ) w }. Note that Φ is huge -its size is 2 nw . The Φ-searchable system is as follows:
• Encrypt(PK, S, M ) where S = (x 1 , . . . , x w ) ∈ T w . Build a vector σ(S) = (σ i,j ) ∈ Σ nw 01 as:
Then output Encrypt HVE (PK, σ(S), M ). The ciphertext size is O(nw) as was the case for comparison queries.
• GenToken(SK, P α ) where α = (A 1 , . . . , A w ). Define σ * (α) = (σ i,j ) ∈ Σ nw 01 * as follows:
Output TK α R ← GenToken HVE (SK, σ * (α)). The token size is O(nw) which is bigger than tokens for comparison queries.
• Setup and Query are the same algorithms from the HVE system, as for comparison queries.
It is easiest to see how this works in the one dimensional settings, namely w = 1. We encrypt a value x ∈ T using an HVE vector
n Consider a predicate P A where, for example, A = {2, 3, n} ⊆ T . We generate a token for P A by calling GenToken HVE (SK, σ * (A)) using the HVE vector
The main point is that x ∈ A if and only if P HVE σ * (A) (σ(x)) = 1. Therefore, correctness and security follow from the properties of the HVE. We obtain a secure system for subset queries for arbitrary subsets.
Theorem 6.2. (Setup, Encrypt, GenToken, Query) is a selectively secure Φ-searchable system assuming (Setup HVE , Encrypt HVE , GenToken HVE , Query HVE ) is an HVE over Σ nw 01 .
Note that the trivial system of Section 3 for subset queries produces ciphertexts of size O(2 n ). The construction above generates ciphertexts of size O(n).
Extensions
Privacy for search queries. In some cases one may want the token TK P not to identify which predicate P is being queried. For example, in the anti-spam example from the introduction, the user may not want to reveal his anti-spam predicate to the server. A similar problem was studied by Ostrovsky and Skeith [17] and is related to Private Information Retrieval [15] . For public-key systems supporting comparison queries this is clearly not possible since, given TK P the server can identify the threshold in P with a simple binary search. It is an open problem to convert our system to a symmetric-key system where TK P does not expose P . One approach is to simply keep the public key secret from the server. This, however, is not sufficient in our system.
Validating ciphertexts. Throughout the paper we assumed that the encryptor is honestly creating ciphertexts as specified by the encryption system. For some applications discussed in the introduction (e.g. spam filtering) this may not be the case. By creating malformed ciphertexts an attacker may generate false-positive or false-negatives for the server using the tokens.
Fortunately, in many settings, such as a payment gateway or spam filter, this is easily avoidable. One technique is to do the following. The authority who has SK will also publish a regular publickey PK 1 and ask the encryptor to (i) encrypt the message S with both the searchable system and with PK 1 . The resulting ciphertext is the pair C = Encrypt(PK, S, 0), Encrypt PKE (PK 1 , S) . When the authority (e.g. visa) receives a ciphertext C = (C 0 , C 1 ) it recovers S from C 1 . It then uses SK to test that C 0 was in fact created from the message S. If not then the transaction is rejected immediately. Similarly, for anti-spam, if this test fails the email would be immediately rejected as spam. In doing so, the authority ensures that a malformed ciphertext did not fool the server.
Hence, Φ-searchable systems should also provide an algorithm Test(C, S, M, SK) that outputs true when C was generated from the message (S, M ) and false otherwise. Our HVE system supports this type of test. Alternatively, one could require the encryptor to prove that his ciphertext is well formed, for example to prove that C 0 is consistent with C 1 . This can be done using non-interactive proof techniques [5, 6] , but as mentioned above, often there is no need for this.
Conclusion
In public key systems supporting queries on encrypted data a secret key can produce tokens for testing any supported query predicate. The token lets anyone test the predicate on a given ciphertext without learning any other information about the plaintext. We presented a general framework for analyzing security of searching on encrypted data systems. We then constructed systems for comparisons and subset queries as well as conjunctive versions of these predicates.
The underlying tool behind these new constructions is a primitive we call HVE. The onedimensional version of HVE (namely = 1) is essentially an Anonymous IBE system. For large we obtain a new concept that is extremely useful for a large variety of searching predicates. We note that by setting = 1 in our HVE construction we obtain a new simple anonymous IBE system secure without random oracles.
This work posses many challenging open problems. For example, the best non-conjunctive (i.e. w = 1) comparison system we currently have requires ciphertexts of size O( √ n) where n is the domain size. In principal it should be possible to improve this to O(log n), but this is currently a wide open problem that will require new ideas. Similarly, for non-conjunctive subset queries the best we have requires ciphertexts of size O(n). Again, can this be improved to O(log n)? Our results mostly focus on conjunction. Are there similar results for disjunctive queries? More generally, what other classes of predicates can we search on?
• The challenger runs Setup(λ) to obtain PK ← (PK 1 , . . . , PK n ) and SK ← (SK 1 , . . . , SK n ) It gives PK to A. Next, A is given the tokens for any predicates of its choice.
• Then A outputs two pairs (S 0 , M 0 ) and (S 1 , M 1 ) subject to the restrictions of the query security game challenge phase. For j = 1, . . . , n the challenger constructs the following ciphertexts:
The challenger gives C ← (C 1 , . . . , C n ) to A.
• The adversary continues to adaptively request query tokens subject to the restrictions of the query security game. Finally, A outputs a bit β ∈ {0, 1} which we denote by EXP
A standard argument shows that
[A] is clearly negligible assuming E is semantically secure against chosen plaintext attacks.
B Proofs for HVE Construction
Suppose the adversary commits to vectors L 0 , L 1 ∈ Σ at the beginning of the game. Let X be the set of indexes i such that L 0,i = L 1,i and X be the set of indexes i such that L 0,i = L 1,i . The adversary can issue predicate queries to request a token for any predicate P HVE L where L ∈ Σ * . Let S be all the indexes for which L is not a wildcard. We distinguish between three types of queries.
Type 1 For all S ∩ X = ∅. That is the predicate does not check any of the indexes in which the challenge tuples differ. These queries can only be made if in the eventual challenge stage
Type 2 Case 1 is not met and there exists an
Type 3 Case 1 and Case 2 are both not met and there exists an i ∈ S ∩ X such that and
These cases are mutually exclusive (by definition) and complete.
B.1 Proof of Lemma 5.2
We prove our lemma by supposing that a poly-time adversary A has non-negligible difference between its advantage in game G and its advantage in game G . We build a simulator that plays the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman game with advantage . The challenger first creates Bilinear Diffie-Hellman challenge as:
It then randomly decides whether to give (Z, T = T ) or (Z, T = R) where R is a random element in G T . We create the following simulation:
Init The attacker gives the simulator two identities L 0 , L 1 . The challenger then flips the coin β internally.
Setup The simulator first chooses random (
The simulator first publishes the group description and g q , V = g p R v . It lets A = e(g a p , g b p ). Finally, for all i it creates:
We observe that the parameters are distributed identically to the real scheme.
Query 1
The adversary will make private key queries to the simulator. The way they are handled depends upon the type of query. Suppose the adversary queries for a key I, where the set of indexes that are non-wild cards is denoted as S.
Type 1 If the adversary issue a Type 1 query, the simulator simply aborts and takes a random guess. The reason for this is by our definition if a type one query is made then the challenge messages M 0 , M 1 will be equal. However, in this case the games G and G are identical, so there can be no difference in the adversary's advantage when he makes this type of a challenge. Therefore, we can just take a random guess.
Type 2 and Type 3 We handle Type 2 and Type 3 queries in the same manner. The primary intuition is that neither a Type 2 or Type 3 query can distinguish the challenge ciphertext. Suppose the adversary queries for a vector I and let γ be an (arbitrary) index where I γ = L β,γ .
The simulator first chooses random r i,1 , r i,2 ∈ Z n ∀i ∈ S. Next it creates:
Additionally, it creates:
Finally, it creates:
The argument for the well-formness of the keys is similar to that of the Boneh-Boyen [8] Identity-Based Encryption system.
Challenge The adversary first gives the simulator messages M 0 , M 1 . If M 0 = M 1 we can abort the simulation and take a random guess for the reason given above. The simulator chooses random Z ∈ G q (Z 1,1 , Z 1,2 ), . . . , (Z ,1 , Z ,2 ) ∈ G 2 q (this can be done since the simulator has g q ). and outputs the challenge as follows:
If T is forms a tuple, then the simulator is playing game G, otherwise it is playing game G .
Query Phase 2 Same as Query Phase 1.
Guess The adversary outputs a guess β . If β = β output 0 otherwise output 1. By our assumption the probability that the adversary guesses β correctly in game G j has a non-negligible difference from that of it guessing it correctly in game G j . However, it is in game G if and only if the challenger gave the simulator R instead of T . Therefore the simulator has advantage in the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman game.
B.2 Proof of Lemma 5.3
We begin by reviewing an assumption called the Bilinear Subgroup Decision problem that was introduced by Boneh, Sahai, and Waters [10] and is implied by the Composite 3-Party DiffieHellman assumption.
For a given group generator G define the following distribution P (λ):
For an algorithm A, define A's advantage in solving the Bilinear subgroup assumption for G as:
where (Z, T )
Definition B.1. We say that G satisfies the Bilinear Subgroup Decision assumption if for any polynomial time algorithm A we have that BSD Adv G,A (λ) is a negligible function of λ.
It is easy to see that the Composite 3-Party Diffie-Hellman assumption implies the Bilinear Subgroup Decision assumption. 2 For simplicity we will use the Decision Subgroup assumption directly in our proof. We suppose that there exist an adversary with non-negligible difference in advantage between winning the game G and the gameG.
We build a simulator that takes in a Bilinear Subgroup challenge (Z, T ). The simulation proceeds as follows.
Setup The simulator setups up the parameters as would the real setup algorithm. All the simulator needs to do this is g p and g q from the assumption.
Query Phase 1
The simulator answers queries as the real authority would. One small difference is that the simulator chooses exponents from Z n instead of Z p . However, this doesn't change anything since the both the simulator and a real authority will raise element from G p to the exponents.
Challenge
Challenge The adversary first gives the simulator messages M 0 , M 1 . If M 0 = M 1 then the adversary simply encrypts the message to the identity L β . Otherwise, the simulator creates the challenge ciphertext of message M β to L β exactly as normal with the exception that C is multiplied by T .
If T is forms a tuple, then the simulator is playing game G , otherwise it is playing gameG.
Query Phase 2 Same as Query Phase 1.
Guess The adversary outputs a guess β . If β = β output 0 otherwise output 1. By our assumption the probability that the adversary guesses β correctly in game G has a non-negligible difference from that of it guessing it correctly in gameG. However, it is in gameG if and only if the challenger gave the simulator R instead of T . Therefore the simulator has advantage in the Bilinear Subgroup Decision game which implies an advantage of in the Composite 3-Party Diffie-Hellman game.
B.3 Proof of Lemma 5.4
We prove our lemma by supposing that a poly-time adversary A has non-negligible difference between its advantage in game G j and its advantage in game G j for some index j. We build a simulator that plays the Composite 3-Party Diffie-Hellman game with advantage .
The challenger first creates a 3-Party challenge as:
It then randomly decides whether to give (Z, T = T ) or (Z, T = R) where R is a random element in G.
We create the following simulation:
Setup Let δ be the j + 1-th index in X. The simulator first chooses random (R u,1 , R h,1 , R w,1 ), . . . , (R u, , R h, , R w, ) ∈ G 3 q and random t 1 , x 1 , y 1 , . . . , t , x , y ∈ Z n .
The simulator first publishes the group description and g q , V = Γ. It picks a random α ∈ Z n and lets A = e(Γ, g p ) α . It next creates
Finally, for all i = δ it creates:
Challenge The adversary first gives the simulator messages M 0 , M 1 . Let X j be the first j indexes in X. The simulator chooses random Z ∈ G q (Z 1,1 , Z 1,2 ), . . . , (Z ,1 , Z ,2 ) ∈ G 2 q (this can be done since the simulator has g q ). and outputs the challenge as follows:
For all i ∈ H j the simulator chooses random elements in G for C i,1 , C i,2 . If M 0 = M 1 the simulator creates C as C = e(Y, g p ) α M 0 , otherwise it chooses a random group element for C . If T is forms a tuple, then the simulator is playing game H j , otherwise it is playing game H j .
Guess The adversary outputs a guess β . If β = β output 0 otherwise output 1. By our assumption the probability that the adversary guesses β correctly in game G j has a non-negligible difference from that of it guessing it correctly in game G j . However, it is in game G j if and only if the challenger gave the simulator R instead of T . Therefore the simulator has advantage in the Composite 3-Party Diffie-Hellman game.
B.4 Proof of Lemma 5.5
We prove our lemma by supposing that a poly-time adversary A has non-negligible difference between its advantage in game G j and its advantage in game G j+1 for some index j. We build a simulator that plays the Composite 3-Party Diffie-Hellman game with advantage .
It then randomly decides whether to give (Z, T = T ) or (Z, T = R) where R is a random element in G. We create the following simulation:
Setup Let δ be the j + 1-th index in X. The simulator first chooses random
The simulator first publishes the group description and g q , V = g p R. It picks a random α ∈ Z n and lets A = e(g p , g p ) α . It next creates It next creates
In this section we focus on the comparison searching problem discussed in Section 3.1 for the special case w = 1, namely the case considered in Figure 1 . We let n denote the domain size. Recall that the trivial system in this case achieves ciphertext size O(n) as does the system based on Hidden Vector Encryption. Here, we briefly describe a construction that achieves ciphertext size of √ n. Boneh, Sahai, and Waters [10] recently described a tracing traitors system where ciphertext size is √ n where n is the number of users in the system. There construction is based on a general primitive called PLBE (Private Linear Broadcast Encryption). Boneh and Waters [11] recently generalized the construction to obtain a trace and revoke system with ciphertexts having the same size. Their generalization is based on a construction for Augmented Broadcast Encryption (ABE). Setting the recipient set S to S = {1, . . . , n} in an ABE system results in a public variant of PLBE which we call public-PLBE. The definition of a public-PLBE is implicit in [11] . For completeness, we give the complete definition in Appendix D here. The main result in [11] is an ABE system with the following parameters:
CT-size = Key-size = PK-size = O( √ n)
This gives a public-PLBE with similar parameters (by setting S = {1, . . . , n}). We denote the algorithms in the BW public-PLBE by (Setup PKLBE , Encrypt PKLBE , Decrypt PKLBE ). We also note that the PLBE of [10] can be easily extended as in [11] to obtain a public-PLBE with parameters Key-size = O(1) , CT-size = PK-size = O( √ n)
In Section 3.1 we defined the set of comparison predicates Φ n,w . We show that for w = 1, any secure public-PLBE gives a Φ n,1 -searchable encryption as follows:
Setup(λ) Run Setup PKLBE (n, λ) to obtain a public key PK and n secret keys (SK 1 , . . . , SK n ).
Output PK and SK := (SK 1 , . . . , SK n ).
Encrypt(PK, s, M ) where s ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Output C R ← Encrypt PKLBE (PK, s, M ).
GenToken(SK, P ) A predicate P ∈ Φ n,1 is a number i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Output TK ← (i, SK i ).
Query(TK, C) Let TK = (i, SK i ). Run Decrypt PKLBE (i, SK i , C).
Using a public-PLBE we thus obtain a Φ n,1 -searchable public key encryption where ciphertext size in √ n. Security follows easily from the properties of public-PLBE.
Theorem C.1. The Φ n,1 -searchable encryption system is secure assuming the underlying public-PLBE is secure.
D Definition of public-PLBE
Boneh and Waters [11] define a primitive called Augmented Broadcast Encryption (ABE) which they use to build a trace and revoke system. Setting the recipient set S to S = {1, . . . , n} in an ABE results in a concept we call public-PLBE. For completeness, we include the full definition here.
A public-PLBE is a restricted broadcast system comprising of the following algorithms:
Setup PKLBE (N, λ) A probabilistic algorithm that takes as input N , the number of users in the system, and a security parameter λ. The algorithm runs in polynomial time in λ and outputs a public key PK and private keys SK 1 , . . . , SK N , where SK u is given to user u.
Encrypt PKLBE (PK, i, M ) Takes as input a public key PK, an integer i satisfying 1 ≤ i ≤ N +1, and a message M . It outputs a ciphertext C. This ciphertext is intended for users {i, i+1, . . . , N }.
Decrypt PKLBE (j, SK j , C) Takes as input the private key SK j for user j and a ciphertext C. The algorithm outputs a message M or ⊥.
The system must satisfy the following correctness property: for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , N + 1} (where j ≤ N ), and all messages M :
Let (PK, (SK 1 , . . . , SK N )) R ← Setup PKLBE (N, Λ) and C R ← Encrypt PKLBE (PK, i, M ).
If j ≥ i then Decrypt PKLBE (j, SK j , C) = M .
Security. We define security of an PKLBE system using two games. The first game is a message hiding game and says that a ciphertext created using index i = N + 1 is unreadable by anyone. The second game is an index hiding game and captures the intuition that a broadcast ciphertext created using index i reveals no non-trivial information about i. We will consider all these games for a fixed number of users, N .
Game 1. The first game, called the Message Hiding Game says that an adversary cannot break semantic security when encrypting using index i = N + 1. The game proceeds as follows:
• Setup The challenger runs the Setup PKLBE algorithm and gives the adversary PK and all secret keys {SK 1 , . . . , SK N }.
• Challenge The adversary outputs two equal length messages M 0 , M 1 . The challenger flips a coin β ∈ {0, 1} and sets C R ← Encrypt PKLBE (PK, N + 1, M β ). The challenger gives C to the adversary.
We define the advantage of adversary A in winning the game as MH Adv A = | Pr[β = β] − 1/2|. Game 2. The second game, called the Index Hiding Game says that an adversary cannot distinguish between an encryption to index i and one to index i + 1 without the key SK i . The game takes as input a parameter i ∈ {1, . . . , N } which is given to both the challenger and the adversary. The game proceeds as follows:
• Setup The challenger runs the Setup PKLBE algorithm and gives the adversary PK and the set of private keys SK j s.t. j = i .
• Challenge The adversary outputs a message M . The challenger flips a coin β ∈ {0, 1} and computes C R ← Encrypt PKLBE (PK, i + β, M ). The challenger returns C to the adversary.
